The Court affirmed the trial court ruling that there was evidence from which the jury could have concluded defendant breached the use clause of the leasing contract it had with plaintiff to build soceer fields on plaintiff's property by its over-illumination of the field lights, which caused light trespass and glare.
Plaintiff church (Prince of Peace) leased part of its land to defendant Solar Socceer Club (Solar) to build soccer fields on Prince of Peace's undeveloped property. In the contract, the parties agreed Solar would use the fields primarily on evenings and weekends, while Prince of Peace would use the fields during the school day for the students in its school. Prince of Peace filed suit against Solar for breach of contract with regard to four provisions, including whether use of the field lights "exceeded the City of Carrollton's standards for light trespass and glare, by as much as six to twelve times the maximum in some locations."
The Planning and Zoning Commission of the Town of Trumball (Commission) denied the special permit of a private school for the installation of four light poles, seventy feet in height, to illuminate its primary athletic field, after considering concerns from resident neighbors of the private school that allowing the lights would adversely affect the "use and enjoyment" of their properties. The Court vacated the lower court's decision which had allowed the private school's case against the Commission because "a zoning commission has discretion to determine whether a proposal satisfies the requirements for a special permit."
Plaintiff private school filed an application for a special permit with the Planning and Zoning Commission of the Town of Trumball (Commission) for the installation of four light poles, seventy feet in height, to illuminate the school’s primary athletic field. The Comission denied the special permit after considering concerns from resident neighbors of the private school that allowing the lights would adversely affect the "use and enjoyment" of their properties.
Defendant company installed a light pole with a protective, adjustable shield in its parking area so that its light shines into the plaintiff's bedroom windows of his residence at night, so plaintiff filed a nuisance suit. The trial court dismissed the nuisance suit because it found that defendant's light was in compliance with the City's Code. The Court reversed the dismissal of plaintiff's nuisance claim because it found that plaintiff had demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact about the reasonableness of defendant's driveway light.
Defendant company installed a light pole with a protective, adjustable shield in its parking area so that its light shines up into the plaintiff's bedroom windows of his residence at night. Plaintiff requested that defendant adjust the shield so that the light was not directed into plaintiff's windows, but defendant refused. Plaintiff then filed a nuisance suit, claiming that defendant's light pole with shielding caused "excessive light." The trial court dismissed the nuisance suit because it found that defendant's light was in compliance with the City's Code.