remanded

The court found that the defendant school district caused a nuisance by allowing its field to be leased to a baseball team that shined its lights on the plaintiff's residence at night, interfering with the plaintiff's sleep. The court directed that an injunction be granted.

The Court affirmed the trial court ruling that there was evidence from which the jury could have concluded defendant breached the use clause of the leasing contract it had with plaintiff to build soceer fields on plaintiff's property by its over-illumination of the field lights, which caused light trespass and glare.

The Borough of Lebanon Planning Board/Board of Adjustment (the Board) denied plaintiff company's application for conditional use variances to the zoning code for off-premises billboard signs "illuminated by five 400-watt lamps mounted at the bottom, facing upwards, located three feet below the face of the sign and six feet away from it." The Court reversed the trial court's decision in favor of plaintiff because it found the trial court did not provide sufficient deference to the Board's finding that light spillover was a justifiable concern and that the plaintiff's illumination compliance with the zoning code was imperfect.

The Planning and Zoning Commission of the Town of Trumball (Commission) denied the special permit of a private school for the installation of four light poles, seventy feet in height, to illuminate its primary athletic field, after considering concerns from resident neighbors of the private school that allowing the lights would adversely affect the "use and enjoyment" of their properties. The Court vacated the lower court's decision which had allowed the private school's case against the Commission because "a zoning commission has discretion to determine whether a proposal satisfies the requirements for a special permit."

The Court found no substantial evidence that the School District's proposed field lighting would have a significant effect on the environment due to the limited hours of operation, limited evening events, and low number of residences impacted in excess of 0.8 foot-candles. The Court also found that the lighting would not substantially impact the historic aesthetic of the neighborhood.

Defendant company installed a light pole with a protective, adjustable shield in its parking area so that its light shines into the plaintiff's bedroom windows of his residence at night, so plaintiff filed a nuisance suit. The trial court dismissed the nuisance suit because it found that defendant's light was in compliance with the City's Code. The Court reversed the dismissal of plaintiff's nuisance claim because it found that plaintiff had demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact about the reasonableness of defendant's driveway light.

The Court found the testimonial evidence of the residents from the other municipality about the effects of the company's construction site in their municipality to be "relevant and probative" to the municipality in this case denying the same company a conditional use permit for a construction site. Part of the residents' concerns from the other municipality was about bright lights and light pollution coming from the company's construction site.

Individuals applied for a permit for a bed and breakfast. City Planning Commission approved the permit in spite of neighbors' concerns. The permit was later denied by City Council; the denial was reversed by the district court. Court found City Council did not issue sufficient findings supporting its denial of the permit, and that the district court should have permitted Council to craft new findings of fact and conclusions of law capable of appellate review.

The Court vacated the Administration Commission decision, finding that reliance in part on neighboring landowner's layperson testimony regarding potential increase of traffic, litter, noise, and light pollution coming from the Recreational Vehicle Park/Campground was not considered substantial evidence. The Court also found that the County's ordinance amending the zoning plan did not make the zoning plan "internally inconsistent." The Court remanded the case to the Administration Commission for reinstatement of the ordinance allowing the Recreational Vehicle Park/Campground as an amended part of the County's zoning plan.

The Court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the plaintiff's illuminated sign does not violate the Town's ordinance because "the mere fact that the LEDs necessarily flash or move at the moment the sign is changing its advertising copy cannot be considered a violation of the other provisions of the ordinance" which prohibit flashing lights on signs. The Court reversed the trial court's order "to the extent it directs the Town to issue a permit for the sign without any limitations" and remanded the matter to the trial court.